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 Customers’ needs are dynamic and evolve in response to unfolding environmental uncertainties. 
The ability of a company or an industry to address these changing customers’ needs in a timely and 
cost-effective way is a measure of its responsiveness. In the space industry, a systemic discrepancy 
exists between the time constants associated with the change of customers’ needs, and the response 
time of the industry in delivering on-orbit solutions to these needs. Increasingly, the penalties 
associated with such delays are becoming unacceptable, and space responsiveness is recognized as a 
strategic imperative in commercial competitive and military environments. 
 In this paper, we provide a critical assessment of the literature on responsive space and 
introduce a new multi-disciplinary framework for thinking about and addressing issues of space 
responsiveness. Our framework advocates three levels of responsiveness: a global industry-wide 
responsiveness, a local stakeholder responsiveness, and an interactive or inter-stakeholder 
responsiveness. We introduce and motivate the use of “responsiveness maps” for multiple 
stakeholders. We then identify “levers of responsiveness,” technical spacecraft- and launch-centric, 
as well as “soft” levers (e.g., acquisition policies) for improving the responsiveness of the space 
industry. Finally, we propose a series of research questions to aggressively tackle problems associated 
with space responsiveness. 
 
Nomenclature 
 
ai  = activity in the space industry following the issuance of a Request for Proposal 
b = individual item reduction exponent  
τai  = time required to complete activity ai 
ci = cost component in the Total Cost of Ownership  
! 
C
TFU
 = cost of the Theoretical First Unit produced 
! 
C
n
th
 = cost of the nth identical unit produced 
MR = mission reliability 
p = pressure 
r = resources 
R =  traditionally referred to as the learning curve, or learning curve slope, or learning rate 
Si = stakeholder in a given industry’s value chain 
T1 = production time of the first unit 
! 
T
n
th
 = production time of the nth identical unit 
V = volume 
β = compressibility 
τ0 = total time elapsed from the instance when the need for a given on-orbit capability is 
identified and formalized to the time when the asset is operational on-orbit and ready to 
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fulfill the function it was intended for 
τLS =  time constant associated with the responsiveness of a local stakeholder 
τSi = total time elapsed for the stakeholder Si (“supplier”) to satisfy its customer’s needs 
τintrinsic(LS)  =  time component of τLS associated with the self-responsiveness of a stakeholder (more 
details in the text) 
τinter_resp =  time component of τLS associated with the interactive responsiveness of a local customer 
with its suppliers 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Customers’ needs are dynamic: they emerge in time and evolve stochastically, prompted by 
unfolding environmental (political, economic, or technological) uncertainties and network 
externalities. The ability of an industry to address these needs in a timely and cost-effective way 
is indicative of its responsiveness.  
 
 In the space industry, a systemic and persistent discrepancy exists between the time constants 
associated with the emergence and change of customers’ needs, and the response time of the 
industry in delivering solutions to address these needs. The needs can consist of a new capability 
on orbit for a military or a commercial customer, or a modification and repositioning of an 
existing on-orbit asset. From the moment when the need is identified and requirements are 
formalized to the time when an operational asset is delivered on-orbit, several years would 
typically elapse. Increasingly, the penalties associated with such time delays are becoming 
unacceptable: for example the opportunity loss or failure to secure the first mover advantage in a 
commercial competitive context, and loss of lives, or lives not saved, in a military context when a 
needed capability is not delivered on time to the battlefield. 
 
 Although different in details, other industries have struggled with conceptually similar issues, 
and management approaches such as Just-in-Time were developed in part to address the 
discrepancy between the rate of change of customers’ needs and the ability of the industry to 
deliver timely solutions to these needs (better inventory management also played a role in the 
Just-in-Time emphasis). “Responsiveness” or “Responsive Space” is the space industry’s close 
analog to the Just-in-Time in other industries. 
 
 The word “responsiveness” has become increasingly popular among decision-makers and 
users of space assets. However, despite its popularity and the emphasis on this concept over the 
last several years, limited progress has been achieved to-date in practical sense (i.e., limited 
industry impact) and in the theoretical underpinnings of responsiveness. The conceptual disarray 
that stymies this subject is best illustrated by the following anecdote: in 2003, an annual 
Responsive Space Conference was established to bring together various stakeholders in an effort 
to address problems associated with the lack of responsiveness in the space industry. However, 
three years later, the conference chair James Wertz acknowledged, “there seemed to be more 
definitions of Responsiveness than participants.”1 In the same vein, Oderman described the term 
as being “fuzzy”, since “it can mean several things depending on whether you are a developer, 
operator, or customer for those systems.”2 It is a truism that in order to discuss any subject matter 
clearly, it is necessary to begin with a clear set of definitions. Much can be gained through careful 
and consistent definitions. “When words are used sloppily, concepts become fuzzy, thinking is 
muddled, communication is ambiguous, and decisions and actions are suboptimal, to say the 
least.”3 In addition to clear definitions, it is important to keep in mind the purpose of these 
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definitions, that is, why and for what objective(s) they have been formulated. Controversies about 
definitions often arise from a failure to keep in mind the purpose a definition is meant to serve. In 
the remaining of this work, we will attempt to provide definitions related to space responsiveness 
that are actionable and can lead to measurement and quantification. 
 
 But while clear and agreed upon definition of space responsiveness is lacking, the need for 
space responsiveness is unambiguous and deeply felt. Consider the following example reported 
by Doggrell: “When it became obvious in September 1990, during the planning for Desert Storm, 
that existing satellite-communications capacity would not support the war effort, we made an 
urgent attempt to launch an additional Defense Satellite Communications System III spacecraft. 
That mission finally launched on 11 February 1992, missing the war by over a year!”4 In addition 
to the military communications needs, there exist other military space assets that can help save 
lives and shorten the duration of a military operation or engagement; lack of space responsiveness 
implies the needed capability is not delivered on time, the consequence of which can be mapped 
into loss of lives or lives not saved.  
 
 It is probably true that space responsiveness was first conceptualized in a military context. 
But the need for responsiveness pervades the space industry as is equally relevant for military and 
commercial applications. In a commercial context, responsiveness is needed to gain and sustain a 
competitive advantage, for example by securing the first-mover advantage against a competing or 
alternate (not space-based) technology. Conversely, lack of responsiveness results in an 
opportunity loss and hence, a loss of potential revenue and value to the shareholders. 
Responsiveness is also relevant and important for scientific space missions. Shotwell and 
Chinnery5 argue that more responsive space would allow scientists to observe and study transient 
phenomena (atmospheric or astrophysical) shortly after they are initiated, instead of many months 
or years later. And Webb adds that “the desired result gained by [more responsive space] for 
science missions is the increased return of science in much shorter time horizons at a lower 
cost.”6 
 
In short, improving space responsiveness is important for military, commercial, and science 
applications and end-customers. 
 
 In this paper, we tackle the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of responsiveness. Our 
objective is to eliminate the “fuzziness” and conceptual disarray that researchers have complained 
about in the growing literature on space responsiveness. The remaining of this paper is organized 
as follows. In Section 2, we draw an analogy from controls theory to place space responsiveness 
on firm conceptual grounds and introduce a metaphorical chronograph for capturing the time 
dimension of responsiveness. In Section 3, we further refine our preliminary discussion of space 
responsiveness by drawing another analogy from the concepts of cost structure and Total Cost of 
Ownership (TCO), and introducing the concept of a “schedule structure” of a space asset. We 
refer to the “schedule structure” of a space asset as the temporal breakdown of each activity from 
the time the need for a new (or modified) on-orbit capability is identified and formalized to the 
time when the asset is operational on-orbit and ready to fulfill the function it was intended for. 
We show that understanding space responsiveness, and identifying credible ways for improving it, 
requires that we thoroughly understand, like the TCO concept, the schedule structure of the asset. 
In Section 4, we address one of the main reasons why responsiveness has remained “fuzzy” to-
date, namely who, or what, is responsive in the space industry. To this effect, we introduce three 
levels of responsiveness, 1) a global industry-wide responsiveness as seen from the perspective 
of the end-customer, 2) a local stakeholder responsiveness as seen from the perspective of each 
individual “local customer” in the value-chain, and 3) an interactive or inter-stakeholder 
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responsiveness. In Section 5, we further expand on the idea of time compressibility and introduce 
the concept of “responsiveness maps” to help guide responsiveness improvement efforts for 
every stakeholder in the space industry. Section 6 discusses various levers for improving space 
responsiveness, and Section 7 concludes this work. 
 
II. Responsiveness: From the control theory to the space industry 
 
A system is commonly characterized as responsive if it can rapidly and with ease react to 
stimulations and exogenous inputs or events. In so doing, the “responsive” system is in effect 
coping efficiently with changes and uncertainty in its environment. This informal characterization 
of responsiveness suggests that time, effort‡, and uncertainty are essential ingredients for our 
understanding of the concept of responsiveness in the space industry. Let us first consider the 
time factor and draw an analogy from control theory: in a controls’ context, a (stable) system’s 
response to a stimulation or input consists of a transient response and a steady-state response. The 
response time of the system is defined as the time elapsed between the onset of the input or 
stimulation and the time when the system’s response gets “close” enough to the steady-state level 
(often taken at 95% or 98% of the steady-state value). Intuitively, responsiveness measures how 
“quickly” a system reaches the steady-state response to a specific stimulation; faster systems 
being more responsive. 
 
In the space industry, the initial stimulation according to which we can start our hypothetical 
chronograph for capturing the time dimension of responsiveness can be for example the instance 
when the need for a new on-orbit capability is identified and formalized (i.e., when the Request 
for Proposal, RFP, is issued). The space industry’s response to this “stimulation” is a series of 
events, design activities, and review gates by which a space asset is developed and readied to 
address the new identified need—this space asset can be a new one, or an upgrade, a 
reconfiguration, or a repositioning of an already existing one. Continuing our metaphor and 
analogy with controls, we can stop our hypothetical chronograph when the asset is operational 
on-orbit (at the required “location”) and ready to fulfill the function it was designed and intended 
for. 
 
In short, from the perspective of the end-customer or the stakeholder with the need for the 
space asset, responsiveness is related to the total time elapsed from the instance when the need for 
a given on-orbit capability is identified and formalized to the time when the asset is operational 
on-orbit and ready to fulfill the function it was intended for. The other non-temporal dimensions 
of responsiveness will be discussed later in this work. 
 
III. Responsiveness: From cost structure to schedule structure 
 
In addition to controls theory, we can draw an analogy with another discipline, cost analysis, 
to help us better understand space responsiveness, and lay the ground for a framework that 
credibly and practically identifies levers for improving space responsiveness. 
 
 The analogy requires that we first understand what a cost structure is. Cost structure is 
sometimes taken to mean total Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) or Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), the 
former being commonly used in a government procurement context. For the purpose of this 
analogy, we do not distinguish between cost structure, LCC, and TCO and use these expressions 
                                                
‡ Required to initiate and complete the system’s response to the unfolding environmental uncertainties, 
which in turn trigger the previously mentioned stimulations and exogenous inputs. 
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interchangeably (the minor differences between them will be indicated shortly. These differences 
however are not relevant for our purposes). 
 
What is the Total Cost of Ownership? As anyone who has bought a capital good (e.g., a car, 
or an apartment) knows, there is more to the cost of an asset than just the “acquisition cost.” Any 
buying decision that is solely based on acquisition cost is likely to be flawed. It is for example 
estimated that the 5-year TCO of a “major computing system can be five to eight times the 
hardware and software acquisition cost.”7 The Total Cost of Ownership includes, in addition to 
the acquisition cost, the costs to operate and maintain the system, as well as other non-obvious 
and indirect costs (the condo fees for example for an apartment, the insurance policy, the utilities, 
etc.). For an IT system, these other costs would include for example the cost to train the support 
personnel, the maintenance cost, the (opportunity) costs associated with system failure or non-
availability, and the cost of power consumption§ of the system. Figure 1 illustrates a typical Total 
Cost of Ownership build-up. The figure starts to the left with the cost of the raw materials that go 
into making the product (e.g., tires). The cost of labor is then added to this first cost category, 
followed by overhead and other cost categories until the acquisition cost is obtained. Traditionally, 
this portion of Figure 1 to the left of the acquisition cost is referred to as the cost structure of the 
product and/or the supplier. The Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) or Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) 
includes, in addition to the acquisition cost, the cost to operate and maintain the system, as well as 
other non-obvious costs that will be incurred during the service life of the system. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustrative Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) build-up. 
 
 
                                                
§ This is particularly relevant for industries with heavy power consumptions, and in which a power efficient 
installation can offset a high acquisition cost with a low(er) operation cost compared with a cheaper but less 
power efficient installation. 
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 What analogy can we draw with the concept of the Total Cost of Ownership to help us better 
understand and practically improve space responsiveness? In the previous section, we argued that 
the time dimension of responsiveness can be measured from the instance when the need for a 
given on-orbit capability is identified and formalized to the time when the asset is operational on-
orbit and ready to fulfill the function it was intended for. Let τ0 be this total time. Conceptually, 
the TCO analysis suggests an analog breakdown be undertaken, not of cost but of the total time τ0. 
The idea is to understand the various activities in the space industry (e.g., design, production, 
reviews, integration, testing, various bottlenecks and waiting times) following the issuance of an 
RFP for a new or modified on-orbit capability and how much time each activity contributes to the 
total time τ0. This is akin to creating a new accounting system with the various activities as line 
items, except that instead of “cost accounting” we have a “time accounting” of each activity.  
 
 In short, understanding space responsiveness, and identifying ways for improving it, requires 
that we thoroughly understand, like the TCO concept, the schedule structure of a space asset or 
the temporal breakdown of each activity and how the total adds up to τ0.  
 
 There is however a difference between a schedule structure and a cost structure that should be 
highlighted. While the TCO is constructed by simple summation of all costs incurred for the 
acquisition and ownership of an asset, τ0 cannot be simply taken as the sum of the durations of all 
activities undertaken to ready the asset for its new on-orbit function. The reason being that not all 
activities are carried out sequentially and overlap between various activities often occurs and 
should be accounted for (the difference is one between total “calendar time” and individual 
activity’s “clock time”). Assume that each activity ai requires a time τai to complete, it is easy to 
see that 
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whereas the total cost of ownership of an asset can be written as 
 
 
! 
TCO = c
i
i
"   (2) 
 
 In order to improve space responsiveness, it is critical to thoroughly understand, 1) what are 
all these activities ai and how do they contribute, or not, to the overall development and readiness 
of the system, 2) what determines the duration of each activity τai and the degree of overlap 
between these activities—the first and second point bring about the idea of streamlining the 
workflow and of “time compressibility” as will be discussed later—and 3) where are the 
bottlenecks, why do they exist and how can they be eliminated. These issues are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
 It is worth stating explicitly that the activities we have alluded to in the previous paragraphs, 
ai, are not only “technical” in nature, but include as well legal, organizational and procedural 
activities (e.g., procurement, design reviews). Our purpose is to account for all activities that 
contribute to τ0, from the ones that are determined by the technical characteristics of the system 
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under considerations, to the ones that are driven by the organization designing the system, and the 
ones that are determined by the interactions between and hand-over from one stakeholder in the 
space industry to another. These issues are discussed in the next section. 
 
IV. Who, or what, is responsive anyway? Three levels of responsiveness 
 
 It has probably become evident at this point in our discussion that responsiveness, unlike 
reliability for example, is NOT a characteristic of a component or a subsystem, but rather a 
higher-level attribute of an industry’s value-chain. More specifically, responsiveness is not an 
attribute for example of the thermal subsystem or of a particular satellite but rather the 
characteristic of the space industry at large (hence, “space” responsiveness). Furthermore, 
although the technical characteristics and architecture of the system under development, a 
satellite in our case, are key drivers of an industry’s responsiveness, or lack of, they are not its 
sole determinant. Efforts to improve space responsiveness should not only focus on the 
architecture and technical characteristics of the artifacts created by said industry, but also include 
the legal, organizational, and managerial aspects of “doing business” in this industry**. These 
issues are further discussed below. 
 
 If beauty is in the eye of the beholder, responsiveness is in the eye of the “customer”; it 
characterizes the reaction time of “suppliers” to an external stimulation (e.g., a new order for 
product X). However, in an industry value-chain, one stakeholder’s customer is often another 
stakeholder’s supplier. Figure 2 provides a symbolic representation of an industry value chain, 
and Figure 3 illustrates the particular case of the space industry. Si in Figure 2 are the various 
stakeholders in this industry and are affected when the end-customer issues a new order for a 
product or a service†† (note that in order to avoid cluttering Figure 2, not all the possible links 
among the various stakeholders are represented). As the end-customer identifies a new need or 
opportunity and issues a RFP for a new asset, that RFP stirs the industry and propagates upstream 
its value-chain. Figure 2 illustrates the fact that there are multiple sets of “customers–suppliers” 
in an industry. Furthermore, one stakeholder’s customer is often another stakeholder’s supplier. 
For example, S22 is the “customer” of S221 and S222, but S22 is also the “supplier” of S2. So who, or 
what is responsive in this industry value-chain? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
** One of the authors (JHS) was involved in an effort to develop a product that took two years to complete 
and fourteen months to finalize an IP (Intellectual Property) and licensing agreement between the various 
stakeholders. Improving “responsiveness” in this case would more beneficially focus on the legal and 
managerial aspects of this effort rather than on the requirements and technical characteristics of the product.  
†† Although not important for our purposes, we do make a distinction in this work between an end-customer 
(who issues the RFP and “pays the bill” for the whole space asset), and the end-user who pays service fees 
for temporary access to some on-orbit capability (e.g., a transponder). 
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Figure 2. Symbolic representation of an industry value-chain. End customer and various 
stakeholders (Si). Not all links are represented.  
 
 
 If the reader agrees with our statement that responsiveness is relevant for “customers” (or 
stakeholders with needs), and characterizes the reaction time of “suppliers” (or stakeholders 
addressing those needs, in whole or in part), then the idea of multiple levels and different types of 
responsiveness becomes evident. In the following, we introduce three levels of responsiveness, 1) 
a global industry-wide responsiveness as seen from the perspective of the end-customer, 2) a 
local stakeholder responsiveness, and 3) an interactive or inter-stakeholder responsiveness. 
In order to discuss these three levels of responsiveness, it is useful to briefly review the space 
industry value-chain. Figure 3 illustrates the different stakeholders that partake in and define the 
space industry value-chain.  
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Figure 3. Stakeholders and the space industry value-chain (adapted from Euroconsult 2004) 
 
 
 While the satellite itself is the lifeblood of the space industry, satellite manufacturers are not 
the only players in this industry. The trends and financial health of this industry are to a large 
extent defined by the stakeholders downstream the value-chain: government agencies (military 
and civilian), satellite operators, and end-users. Starting to the left of Figure 3, satellite 
manufacturers work with a host of suppliers and equipment providers. For example, batteries, 
solar cells, thermal subsystems, attitude control equipment, and payloads are sometimes acquired 
from suppliers rather than being developed in-house by the satellite manufacturer—for simplicity, 
Figure 3 shows only box for the various “equipment providers”. Launch providers and range 
operators, subsumed under “launch services” box in Figure 3, also work with a host of suppliers 
from engine providers and other propulsion related equipment to launch facility developers and 
other ground support equipment suppliers. Downstream the value-chain, Figure 3 shows the 
satellite operators such as Intelsat-Panamsat, SES, or Eutelsat, and government agencies such as 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) or the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO). Further to the right, Figure 3 shows a host of end-users, military, consumers, and a 
variety of corporate users of on-orbit capabilities. Furthermore, banks, investors, insurance 
companies, and regulatory agencies all participate in the space industry and influence it to 
varying degrees. And last but not least, the general public and taxpayers are “stake-”holders in the 
space industry since their money contributes to funding the science and military ventures in space. 
 
 Now that we have briefly covered what the space industry value-chain is, we can more 
clearly discuss where responsiveness resides or what does it characterize in this value-chain, and 
what the three levels of responsiveness we introduced previously are. We have argued that 
responsiveness is relevant for the doublet customer–suppliers and characterizes the reaction time 
of suppliers in addressing customer’s needs.  
 
A. Global responsiveness 
 
 The global or industry-wide responsiveness is seen from the perspective of the end-customer. 
This is a “macro-level” attribute of the whole industry. We refer to the end-customer in the space 
industry as the one who issues the RFP for a given space capability and “pays the bill” for the 
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whole space asset (as opposed to an end-user who might lease some on-orbit capacity (e.g., a 
transponder) for a given period of time). Regardless of how the industry is structured, whether 
there are hundred of suppliers or just a couple of them, from the perspective of the end-customer, 
what matters is the time elapsed from the issuance of the RFP for a space asset until the asset 
become operational on-orbit; this is what we referred to previously as τ0. Symbolically, we can 
represent this relationship as a block diagram in which the “black box” contains all the suppliers 
(Σ(Si)) that interact with the end-customer (Figure 4). Improving global responsiveness of an 
industry implies among other things reducing or compressing τ0 as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figures 4. Global responsiveness, end-customer, and block diagram 
 
 
But how do we do that? Conceptually, compressing τ0, and consequently improving global 
responsiveness, can be achieved by three different types of actions, as shown in Figure 5: 1) 
eliminating bottlenecks in the value-chain and minimizing waiting periods, 2) maximizing 
overlap, to the degree possible, between different streams of activities at different suppliers, and 3) 
compressing the “response time” of each supplier. In practice, in order to identify levers for 
improving responsiveness, we first need to define lower level responsiveness—the constituents or 
components of this global responsiveness—where practical improvement actions can be taken. 
Two additional levels are introduced next to this effect, local stakeholder responsiveness, and 
interactive or inter-stakeholder responsiveness. 
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Figure 5. Conceptual improvement of global responsiveness 
 
 
B. Local stakeholder responsiveness 
 
 Beyond the global responsiveness, we can define recursively the responsiveness of each 
stakeholder as we go upstream a given industry value-chain. The local responsiveness of an 
individual stakeholder Si is seen from the perspective of its local customer (as opposed to the 
“end-customer”). For example, in Figure 2, the local responsiveness of S11 is seen from the 
perspective of its customer, S1, and is related to the total time elapsed from the instance when S1 
formalizes its needs with respect to a given supplier, here S11, to the time when S11 delivers the 
required product and/or service and fulfills its customer’s needs. Let τSi be this total time. 
Improving local responsiveness implies among other things reducing or compressing τSi. 
 
 
Figure 5. Local responsiveness, individual stakeholder, and local customer in an industry value-chain 
 
 
A local customer often interacts with multiple suppliers. For example, S3 in Figure 2 interacts 
with S31 and S32 and is their “local customer.” A different kind of responsiveness therefore can be 
defined than the one presented previously: it is related to the total time elapsed from the instance 
when a local customer formalizes its needs to the time when ALL its suppliers deliver the 
products and/or services requested by this customer. We prefer our first definition of local 
AIAA Space 2007  AIAA-2007-6015 
18-20 September 2007, Long Beach, CA 
 
 
 12 
stakeholder responsiveness as it is more actionable than the “cumulative” second one (which 
“cumulates” the response times of all suppliers of a local customer, and thus dilutes the ability to 
identify bottlenecks and act upon them). 
 
C. Interactive or inter-stakeholder responsiveness 
 
 Who controls, or who has the ability to improve responsiveness? From the previous 
discussion, it might be concluded that each stakeholder, by improving its own local 
responsiveness, contributes to improving the global responsiveness. This is true, but is only part 
of the story. Let us consider another analogy with the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) to illustrate 
this point. Who controls the TCO of a system, and who has the ability to reduce it? As Figure 1 
shows, there is a significant component of the TCO related to the Acquisition Cost that is 
controlled by the supplier. Thus, a supplier that improves its cost structure and reduces the 
acquisition cost will contribute to reducing the TCO. Similarly, a supplier that improves its local 
responsiveness (τSi) contributes to improving the responsiveness of its own customer. But Figure 
1 also shows there is a part of the TCO that is jointly controlled by the customer and the supplier. 
Thus their joint efforts can also contribute to reducing the TCO. In other words, the TCO is not 
only the responsibility of the supplier nor is it only controlled by the supplier, but it also includes 
a joint responsibility of–and control by–the supplier and the customer. Similarly, the 
responsiveness of a local customer is not only dependent upon and determined by the 
responsiveness of its suppliers, but also by how well (or efficiently) the customer interacts and 
works with its suppliers. This is what we refer to as interactive or inter-stakeholder 
responsiveness; it characterizes the time-efficiency of the interaction between any two 
stakeholders in an industry value-chain. For example in Figure 2, the responsiveness of S22 is not 
only determined by the intrinsic responsiveness of its suppliers, S221 and S222 (and the time 
constant associated with their responsiveness, τS221 and τS222), but also by the time-efficiency of 
the interaction between S22 and its two suppliers. For example, a customer that can finalize 
procurement agreements with its suppliers in a few weeks has a better interactive responsiveness 
than one requiring several months to set up such agreements. We define τinter_resp as the time 
constant associated with this interactive responsiveness. ‡‡  We emphasize again that this 
interactive responsiveness is jointly controlled and determined by the customer and the supplier. 
Symbolically, we write the time constant associated with the responsiveness of a local 
stakeholder, τLS, as a function of the response times of all its suppliers Si (i = 1 to n) plus the 
interactive responsiveness as shown in Eq. 3: 
 
! 
" LS = f " S1 ;" S2 ;...;" Sn( ) + " inter_resp  +  " intrinsic(LS)  (3) 
 
τintrinsic(LS) is a time component of τLS that captures the speed and efficiency by which a local 
stakeholder (LS) can address its own customer’s needs irrespective of, or following its suppliers’ 
responsiveness and the interactive responsiveness, as shown in Eq. 3. Intrinsic(LS) can be termed 
the local customer’s “self-responsiveness,” and is function of the internal technical skills within 
the company as well as the managerial skills and organizational structure that facilitates or 
hamper lean operations and decision-making (Eq. 3 is only a symbolic representation; a more 
                                                
‡‡ In reality, this time constant should be indexed to reflect the interactive responsiveness of a local 
customer with each of its suppliers. We have omitted the index in this work to alleviate the notation, and 
because it does not contribute much to the focus of this paragraph. If we want to be precise however, 
τinter_respsvns can be defined as the AVERAGE time associated with the interactive responsiveness of a local 
customer with ALL its suppliers. 
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formal representation would have to include in addition to f(.), two functions g(.) and h(.) that are 
monotonically increasing with their arguments  τinter_resp and τintrinsic(LS). Such formalism however is 
not relevant for the purposes of our discussion). 
 
The functional dependence of τLS on various parameters (Eq. 3) is further discussed in the 
following two sections. 
 
V.  Improving responsiveness: From cost reduction to time compressibility and 
responsiveness maps 
 
 In the previous paragraphs, we suggested that efforts to improve responsiveness (when 
unqualified, global responsiveness is implied) bears some conceptual similarities to cost reduction 
efforts in a company or an industry. In this section, we expand on this idea with a brief theoretical 
presentation, followed in the next section, by a more practical discussion of various levers for 
improving space responsiveness. 
 
 
 
A. Cost reduction 
 
 Cost reduction efforts are a fixture in every industry, and they reflect one way by which a 
company attempts to remain competitive in ever-increasing competitive environments. While cost 
reduction efforts appear sporadically to the general public in dramatic job cuts following an 
industry restructuring (e.g., in the U.S. aerospace industry in the 1990s), or heightened 
competitive pressure (e.g., in the U.S. automotive industry recently), such efforts occur 
nevertheless on an on-going basis in well-managed companies, and involve many more levers 
than job elimination (and sometimes none). Many cost drivers can be targeted during these cost 
reduction efforts. Recall the concept of an industry cost structure and the Total Cost of Ownership; 
job cuts reduce the “cost of labor” and “overhead,” but as Figure 1 shows, there are many other 
levers to reduce the TCO and improve a company’s cost structure.  
 
In short, cost cutting happens on an on-going basis as part of learning and continuous 
improvement efforts in well managed companies. And it involves a broad panoply of levers to 
achieve the desired cost reductions. 
 
B. Responsiveness and “time compressibility” 
 
 A conceptual parallel can be drawn between cost reduction and responsiveness improvement 
efforts. We argued in the previous sections that the time dimension of responsiveness is related to 
τ0 for the global responsiveness, and τSi for the local stakeholder responsiveness. Improving a 
company’s or an industry’s responsiveness implies among other things compressing these time 
metrics. Furthermore, responsiveness improvement, like cost reduction, is best accomplished 
when it is carried out on an on-going basis as part of a learning and continuous improvement 
process (i.e., when it becomes engrained in a company’s performance culture) and not just as a 
one-time effort. Furthermore, as Eq. 1 and 3 suggest, responsiveness improvement, just like cost 
reduction efforts, can and should target multiple levers for better results. Some of these levers are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
 In fluid dynamics, a compressibility metric is defined as the relative volume change of a fluid 
per unit increase in pressure, and is written: 
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More precise definitions of isothermal compressibility and adiabatic compressibility are not 
relevant for the purposes of this work. By analogy, we can define a time compressibility metric as 
the relative change in say τ0 per unit increase in effort or resources. Symbolically, we write: 
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This time compressibility metric can be defined for every activity ai in the space industry that 
follows the issuance of an RFP for a new or modified on-orbit capability (introduced in Section 3). 
What use can we make of this metric? This question is discussed in the following subsection. 
 
C. Responsiveness maps 
 
 The time compressibility metric of activities helps the analyst and decision-maker to think 
explicitly about the functional dependence of the schedule for developing a spacecraft on the 
resources that can be allocated to the various activities in the development and manufacturing 
process. Consider the following anecdote. In a recent conversation with a satellite manufacturer, 
we were informed that a major satellite operator has set its decision criteria for selecting the 
satellite manufacturer for its next satellite as the delivery schedule (i.e., how fast can the 
manufacturer complete and deliver the satellite) followed by the acquisition cost of the satellite 
(i.e., at what cost). This situation illustrates the mounting pressure for more responsiveness in the 
commercial space business, and highlights the possibility of various trades between 
cost/resources and development and manufacturing schedule.§§ But how are we to make these 
trade-offs, or what guidelines can we rely on in our choices? The time compressibility metric for 
each activity can be one such guide. This metric need not be considered with the analytic rigidity 
that Eq. 5 may unintentionally imply, but can be assessed qualitatively (e.g., low, medium, high) 
through the solicitation of experts’ opinion and judgment of engineers and program managers. 
For a given stakeholder, Si, in the space industry, {ai,j | j = 1 to m} are all the activities performed 
by said stakeholder to satisfy its customer’s needs, and τai,j is the duration of each activity, we 
define a “responsiveness map” as follows (Figure 6): the x-axis is constituted by the 
compressibility of each activity undertaken by said stakeholder, and the y-axis is the normalized 
duration of each activity with respect to the total response time of the stakeholder (i.e., how 
important in duration is each activity, or how much of a chokepoint or bottleneck it is—this can 
                                                
§§ This is related to the manufacturer’s responsiveness, not the global space industry’s responsiveness, 
which would have to include the responsiveness of the launch ranges and the spacelift. 
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be half-jokingly termed a measure of each activity’s “bottleneck-ness *** ”). Each activity 
undertaken by Si is then placed on this responsiveness map. 
 
 
  
 
         Figure 6. Responsiveness map for a given stakeholder Si 
 
 
Figure 6 can be read or interpreted as follows: 
  
1) The upper-right corner contains activities that are highly compressible (e.g., ai,1), i.e., 
with limited additional effort or resources (people and/or money) their time to completion 
can be dramatically reduced. Furthermore, these activities are major contributors to the 
total response time of the stakeholder, i.e., they constitute important bottlenecks. 
Therefore, these activities in the upper-right corner should be tackled first in a 
responsiveness improvement effort. 
2) As anyone who has been involved in engineering design and development efforts knows, 
there are some activities that cannot be easily completed in shorter amounts of time 
despite additional resources (people and/or money) allocated to them. These activities can 
be found to the left of Figure 6 in the low compressibility sector. The upper-left corner 
of Figure 6 contains activities that cannot be easily compressed (e.g., ai,2), but that 
constitute important bottlenecks for the company. In other words, the time reduction 
sought in tackling these activities are more difficult to obtain than in streamlining the 
activities in the upper-right corner. 
                                                
*** This is slightly different from the “critical path” analysis described in the Industrial Engineering and 
Operations Management literature. 
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3) The lower-left corner contains activities that are neither easily compressible nor do they 
constitute bottlenecks in the overall workflow of the company (e.g., ai,3). 
4) The lower-right corner contains activities that are easily compressible but they do not 
constitute bottlenecks in the overall workflow of the company (e.g., ai,4). 
 
Responsiveness maps can be developed for every stakeholder in the space industry. And multiple 
layers or levels of detail can be included on these maps. Once such maps are developed, a 
company can prioritize its responsiveness improvement effort by tackling activities in the higher 
priority sectors as shown in Figure 7.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Responsiveness map and prioritization for improvement efforts 
 
 
 Let us now step back for a moment and reflect upon the time compressibility and 
responsiveness map concepts. The time compressibility metric, we argued previously, is a useful 
device that helps systems engineers and program managers think about and identify what the 
schedule for developing a complex system, e.g., spacecraft, is dependent upon. The time 
compressibility metric, as defined in Eq. 5, captures one important functional dependence, 
namely the relationship between schedule and resources. The development schedule however, 
and more generally τLS and τ0, are not only dependent upon resources, but also on other 
“structural” considerations: for example, a change in development process, a modification of 
program reviews, a change in the architecture of the system under development, or a change in 
the procurement practices can significantly impact τLS and τ0, by modifying or eliminating some 
AIAA Space 2007  AIAA-2007-6015 
18-20 September 2007, Long Beach, CA 
 
 
 17 
of the activities {ai,j | j = 1 to m}. In the following section, we discuss these “structural” 
considerations, which we refer to as “levers of responsiveness” in the case of the space industry. 
 
VI. Levers of responsiveness 
 
 Where shall responsiveness improvements be found? What in the space industry can be 
improved upon, or done differently, and that would result in increasing the industry’s 
responsiveness? The answer to this latter question defines what we refer to as levers of 
responsiveness. To further clarify our terminology, we recognize for example system complexity 
as a lever of responsiveness, since its modification or change (as a system-level design choice) 
impacts the responsiveness of the space industry, in particular, the responsiveness of the satellite 
manufacturer. As an illustration, consider the fact that a highly complex system such as the 
Cassini spacecraft for example required approximately seven years to develop and launch, 
whereas the lower complexity Mars Global Surveyor required less than three years to develop and 
launch. In other words, lowering system complexity, or making design choices that result in 
lower system complexity, improves the industry’s responsiveness. This statement however should 
not be interpreted as making the case for lower complexity spacecraft design: whether this lever 
is to be pulled—and to what extent—or not is dependent upon numerous considerations that are 
not within the scope of this work. A more detailed discussion of this complexity lever will follow 
shortly. 
 
 In a broad sense, improving the (global) space industry’s responsiveness can be achieved, on 
the one hand by improving each or any local stakeholder’s responsiveness††† (i.e., having more 
responsive satellite manufacturers, launch providers, and/or launch ranges, and in general more 
responsive “suppliers”), and on the other hand, by improving each or any inter-stakeholder 
responsiveness across the space industry value-chain. In the following, we discuss some ways in 
which this can be achieved. Our discussion is not meant to exhaustive or normative, and in some 
cases, we simply identify the responsiveness lever and highlight trade-offs between 
responsiveness and other attributes. 
 
A.  Levers related to design choices and architecture of the system under development 
 
 As discussed in the previous section, providing additional resources for a given task is not the 
only way, and sometimes not the most efficient way, by which said task can be accomplished 
more speedily. In addition to resources, the development and manufacturing schedule of a system 
also depends on the nature and characteristics of the system under development. These 
characteristics or system-level attributes, in turn, propagate throughout the system (to the 
subsystem and component level, and their interfaces), and determine to a large extent the duration 
of each task necessary to design and field the system. For example, the development and 
manufacturing schedule of a toaster is different from, and intrinsically shorter than, that of a 
washing machine, which in turn is different from and shorter than that of a satellite. This 
difference in the development and manufacturing schedule is dependent upon the architecture and 
system-level characteristics of these three artifacts. In the following, we discuss some of these 
characteristics as levers of responsiveness for the space industry. 
 
 
 
                                                
††† Including the suppliers’ and the intrinsic responsiveness of a local customer, as shown in Eq. 3 and 
discussed in Subsection IV-B. 
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Complexity 
 Complexity is an increasingly appealing subject for scientists and engineers, as evidenced by 
the growing number of journals dedicated to the subject,‡‡‡ and the exponential growth of papers 
addressing various aspects of complexity.§§§ Engineers are interested in design complexity, its 
measures, and implications on schedule, cost, and risk among other things. Both theoretical work 
and empirical research have shown that design complexity dramatically impacts the development 
and assembly time of a product. Braha and Maimon for example developed, in a very interesting 
paper, a complexity measure that can be used as a predictive tool in the early design stages to 
“estimate the approximate [manufacturing / assembly] times, allowing the comparison of 
competing concepts.”8 A similar work by Bashir and Thomson9 demonstrated empirically than 
the complexity of a system is the dominant parameter in estimating the development schedule 
(not just the manufacturing time) of an engineering product.  
 
 But what is complexity? The following anecdote helps set the stage for an answer. Saint 
Augustine, in Book XI of his Confessions, asks what is Time. “Provided that no one asks me, I 
know; if I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know […] yet what do we speak of, in our 
familiar everyday conversation, more than of time?” This same answer is applicable if we replace 
“time” by “complexity.” In other words, complexity, and its opposite, simplicity, are easy to 
understand intuitive concepts, but are difficult to formalize and quantify. Lloyd10 provides a list 
of over forty measures of complexity, grouped under three headings: 1) difficulty of creation, 2), 
difficulty of description, and 3) degree of organization. The Nobel laureate Murray Gell-Mann11 
provides a qualitative discussion of complexity, which is related to Lloyd’s classification—Lloyd 
and Gell-Mann have been collaborators for many years—and Summers and Shah12 provide an 
extensive discussion of measures of complexity in the particular case of engineering design. For 
the purposes of this work, we use complexity as indicative of, 1) the total number of subsystems 
or components used in an engineering system, including identical ones, 2) the number of different 
kinds of subsystems used, and, 3) the number of interfaces and connections between these 
subsystems.  
 
 Space systems are highly complex artifacts by nature. Their complexity however is not 
homogeneous and some spacecraft are far more complex than others. The choice of, or the 
specifications of the requirements that define spacecraft complexity dramatically impacts the 
responsiveness of satellite manufacturers, as illustrated in Figure 8. There are three ways by 
which complexity acts as a powerful lever of responsiveness. First, a decrease in system 
complexity reduces the number (and diversity) of subsystems and payload instruments to be 
developed, as well as their connections and interfaces; in so doing, lower complexity results in 
shorter design and development times for the different “parts” of a spacecraft. This first argument 
can be termed the component-centric influence of the complexity lever on space responsiveness. 
The second line of reasoning is a systems engineering argument: a decrease in spacecraft 
complexity reduces the amount of time required to assemble and test the whole spacecraft. Third, 
a reduction in spacecraft complexity is likely to result in fewer stakeholders and suppliers 
involved in delivering “parts” to the spacecraft (components, subsystems, and or payload 
instruments); since fewer suppliers are easier to manage than a plethora of them, reduced 
                                                
‡‡‡ There are at present over half a dozen journals with “Complexity” in their title, e.g., Complexity 
International, Computational Complexity, Journal of Complexity, Progress in Complexity, Information and 
Design, and Complexity to name a few. 
§§§ Approximately 1200 journal papers per year since 2005, double the average number published a decade 
ago, and three times more than the number of papers published on the subject fifteen years ago (Source: 
Web of Science ®). 
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spacecraft complexity has the potential to improve the interactive responsiveness. In short, 
spacecraft complexity influences all the parameters identified in Eq. 3, in which the local 
stakeholder (LS) is the satellite manufacturer. 
 
 More research is necessary to quantify the impact of complexity on the design and 
development schedule of a spacecraft (recent work by Bearden13 and Bitten et al.14 constitute a 
very useful step in this work; the authors emphasize the relationship between complexity, 
schedule constraints, and risk or mission success in planetary missions). Such research can be 
both theoretical in nature and empirical (involving data collection and analysis); both aspects 
complementing each other. It would be useful for example to develop parametric schedule models, 
similar to the traditional cost models, relating schedule to spacecraft parameters such as 
complexity, mass, power, TRL, payload characteristics, and or other parameters. While satellite 
cost models are pervasive throughout the space industry, schedule models are practically non-
existent. Although satellite cost and schedule are correlated, we believe it is important, when 
investigating matters relevant to responsiveness, to develop parametric models in which schedule 
is the independent variable, as opposed to cost. Such a research effort is particularly valuable 
given the emphasis in recent years on space responsiveness, as it would allow to identify and 
quantify trade-off—and articulate them to decision-makers—relating spacecraft attributes such as 
complexity (and other attributes) to the design and development schedule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Spacecraft complexity versus design and development schedule (including ATLO) 
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Heritage, learning curve, and Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
 The three terms, heritage, learning curve, and TRL, cover different but closely related 
concepts in engineering design. They are discussed in this section inasmuch as they act as levers 
of space responsiveness. The idea of improvement in cost and assembly time resulting from 
repetitive tasks was probably recognized as early as the American System of Manufacturing—or 
the use of standardized, interchangeable parts—was devised by Eli Whitney in the late 1790s,**** 
and later with the advent of mass production.††††, 15 
 But the idea of such improvements as a function of “repetitiveness” was formalized in 1936 with 
the publication of a now-famous article by T.P. Wright entitled “Factors affecting the cost of 
airplanes.”16 Wright proposed a power law to model the improvements resulting from repetitive 
tasks and production of multiple identical units, n; his model has been widely adopted ever since. 
Wright’s model has also been adopted for development and assembly times—see for example 
Boothroyd et al.17 —in addition to its original focus on cost improvements, and can be written as 
follows: 
 
! 
T
n
th = T1 " n
b    (6) 
 
and 
 
! 
b "
ln(R /100)
ln(2)
< 0   (7) 
 
The cost analog of this model (E q. 6) is sometimes written as follows: 
 
! 
C
n
th = CTFU " n
b   (8) 
 
In some publications, the exponent b is replaced by, and should not be confused with, the total 
batch reduction exponent B (as opposed to the individual item reduction exponent in Eq. 8). “The 
learning rate (R) for the space and aerospace industry is such that, on average, the nth unit will 
cost between 87% and 96% of the previous unit.”18  
 The application of Eq. 6, and the schedule advantages—or time compressibility—resulting 
from heritage and learning curve effects are illustrated in Figure 9 and 10. Figure 9 shows the 
(normalized) reduction in production time for a single unit, the nth identical unit produced, 
whereas Figure 10 illustrates the cumulative production time for n identical units with and 
without learning effects. Heritage, as shown in Figure 10, is the “depth of the past” or the amount 
of experience in producing identical units (n), whereas what is traditionally referred to as the 
learning curve, or learning rate, R is another parameter that determines the improvements (in 
terms of production time or cost) between two identical and consecutive units produced. 
                                                
**** Although credit for the idea of interchangeable parts goes to a French gunsmith, Honoré Le Blanc, 
who first suggested it in the mid 18th century, but did not go very far with it because other gunsmiths saw 
this idea as a threat to their livelihood and opposed it.  
†††† Mass production is traditionally associated with Henry Ford and his Model T car. However, although 
Ford popularized the concept (around 1910), high-volume production of items from standardized parts, i.e., 
mass production, had been achieved many years earlier. For example, during the American Civil War, the 
Springfield Armory was producing over 300,000 rifles per year for the Union Army in 1863, almost as 
many as the peak production of the Model T Ford.15 
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Incidentally, R is not appropriately labeled “learning slope” or “learning rate” since, for example 
when R = 100%, no “learning” occurs, and as R decreases, more learning effects are reaped. It 
would be more accurate to designate the complement of R, 1-R, as the “learning slope” or 
“learning rate.” 
 
Figure 9. Learning effects and reduction in production time resulting from repetitive tasks (R = 90%) 
 
 
 In addition to heritage and learning curves, the aerospace community has also developed and 
widely adopted the concept of Technology Readiness Levels, or TRL: “TRL [is] systematic 
metric/measurement that supports, 1) the assessments of the maturity of a particular technology, 
and, 2) the consistent comparison of maturity between different types of technology.”19 For 
example, a TRL 2 refers to a technology concept that has been formulated but no hardware has 
yet been built or tested; a TRL 6 refers to a system/subsystem that is in prototype stage, its 
functions and technology concepts having been demonstrated in and outside the laboratory 
environment; and a TRL 9 refers to an actual system that has been “flight proven through 
successful mission operations.”19 TRL has been traditionally used to assess the development (and 
cost) risk of a spacecraft. It is easy to see the close connection between TRL and heritage. A low 
TRL for example is conceptually concerned with issues occurring to the left of “1” on the x-axis 
in Figures 9 and 10, that is, a low TRL refers to the levels of readiness/maturity of a technology 
before a system/subsystem based on said technology is actually built, whereas a high TRL, say 9, 
becomes analogous to heritage. In other words, the concept of TRL is a high-resolution view 
centered on this “1” and its neighborhood on the x-axis in Figures 9 and 10. 
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Figure 10. Heritage and learning effects (R = 80%) 
 
 
 It is intuitive to conceive of the TRL, learning curves and heritage as levers of space 
responsiveness. In the following, we “bundle” to these three concepts under the heading 
“technology heritage.” Technology heritage is an important choice with significant implications 
on the design of space systems in general, and space responsiveness in particular. For example, 
whether only in-flight proven technologies should be admitted in response to an RFP, or not, has 
clear implications on the design and development schedule of a spacecraft. 
 
 Technology heritage, like spacecraft complexity, is likely to impact all the parameters 
identified in Eq. 3, which determine the responsiveness of a local customer—in this case, 
primarily the satellite manufacturer. No empirical research that we are aware of has been 
conducted to assess and statistically analyze and model the impact of technology heritage on the 
development and deign schedule of space systems. Such a study would be particularly relevant, 
although challenging, in the current emphasis on space responsiveness, as it would help quantify 
the extent to which technology heritage acts as a lever of responsiveness.  
 
 Finally, it is worth noting that technology heritage is a lever of responsiveness that should be 
manipulated with caution. On the one hand, new or untested technologies (low TRL) might cause 
schedule delays, thus penalizing responsiveness. On the other hand, high TRL or significant 
experience (or heritage) with a given technology, which has a positive impact on responsiveness, 
can be indicative of technology obsolescence resulting in uncompetitive value of the system in 
which said technology is embedded. This argument is conceptually related to the traditional 
problem of “exploration versus exploitation” in several disciplines such as computer science and 
machine learning, decisions analysis, and organizational behavior to name a few. It would be 
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interesting to analytically explore this problem in an engineering design context in general, and 
spacecraft design in particular.‡‡‡‡ 
 
Modularity, Plug-n-Play (PnP), and standardization of interfaces 
 Modularity in engineering design has been profusely discussed in the technical literature, 
however its application to, and impact on space systems remain to be further explored. It is 
discussed in this section inasmuch as it constitutes a lever of space responsiveness. 
 
The many definitions of modularity—see for example Gershenson et al.20, for a good survey 
of various definitions of modularity—are directly related to and derive from the notion of module. 
A module is a component or group of self-contained components with the following 
characteristics:  
 
i. it has well-defined interfaces to a platform, a system, and/or other modules,  
ii. it provides a specific self-contained function within the system in which it is embedded21,  
iii. it can be “removed (or interchanged) from a product non-destructively as a unit”22,  
iv. The following characteristic is not always mentioned or agreed upon in the literature, but 
we feel it is important for the purposes of our discussion: a module can be easily 
“plugged” into a system, and both its presence and the function it provides are directly 
recognized by the system and put to use accordingly.  
 
Modularity, in turn, becomes the property of a system that supports, to varying extent, the use of 
modules in the design of the system. This definition, when applied to the design of spacecraft, has 
two major and distinct impacts on the responsiveness of the space industry. The first impact 
operates at the system or architectural level, and the second impact operates at the module level 
itself. These are discussed in the following paragraphs. It is worth recalling before getting into 
our discussion that traditionally, the opposite of a “modular architecture is an integral 
architecture [in which] modifications to any one particular component or feature may require 
extensive redesign of the product.”23 This property of an integral architecture is to be contrasted 
with the characteristics (i), (ii), and (iii) of modules/modular architecture discussed previously. 
 
 The first impact of modularity on responsiveness operates at the system or architectural level. 
In the following, we contrast, in a simplified manner, the design, assembly, and test time of an 
integral design with that of a modular deign in order to clarify and highlight how modularity acts 
as a lever of responsiveness. 
 Consider first an integral design (the “opposite” of modularity) in which things are tightly 
coupled, physically and functionally. Because of the lack of physical and functional separation, 
the system’s development cycle is constrained to a large extent to be sequential, with limited or 
no possible overlap between different development phases. For example, assembly of 
interdependent parts can only start once their entire design is complete. Conceptually, we can 
write the total development time of an integral design as follows: 
 
! 
" integral = " design + " assembly + " testing    (9) 
 
                                                
‡‡‡‡ This problem in the context of space system design admits several aspects. For example, 1) does an 
optimal TRL (or level of technology heritage) exist for the space industry? 2) In what context is a low or 
high TRL more appropriate? And more importantly, 3) what are the relationships and trade-offs between 
TRL, responsiveness, and competitiveness?  
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 By contrast, modularity gives the opportunity to reorganize the development phases in a 
non-strictly sequential way. Decoupling of functions between different modules allows a certain 
degree of parallelism among the tasks performed during the development of the whole system. 
Since modules are separate providing specific and self-contained functions, they can be designed, 
assembled and tested separately, that is, simultaneously. Since consecutive operations for an 
integral design can, for a modular design, be accomplished, to varying extent in parallel, 
significant time-savings are possible, which translate into responsiveness improvement. 
Consequently, the first impact of the modularity lever on responsiveness operates at the system or 
architectural level by enabling overlap between various activities in the development cycle of a 
“modular” system design. Symbolically, this can be represented by a negative term, -τoverlap, that 
can be added to Eq. 9. 
 
 The second impact of modularity on responsiveness operates at the module level itself. 
Modularity is sometimes designated in the literature as a “plug-n-play” (PnP) approach, in 
particular when the characteristic (iv) of modules discussed previously is assumed. Interfaces 
between modules (and/or between modules and platform) need to be designed in advance, and 
modules must comply with the standards thus pre-defined in order to be re-used and easily 
connected, through these interfaces, to the platform or overall system. This upfront investment in 
modularity and standardization of interfaces presents many benefits, including long-term cost 
savings. The cost benefits resulting from modularity have been studied by Enright et al.24 in the 
case of spacecraft design. Similarly, we contend that schedule reduction, or responsiveness 
improvement, result from the adoption of modular designs and standardization of interfaces in the 
following manner.  
 First, certain tasks performed once on a given module do not need to be performed again 
when this module is re-used (or a similar module being built). By contrast, these tasks have to 
occur every time a new system is developed in an integral design. Thus, the resulting time 
reduction consists of a clear discontinuity between the time needed to design, qualify, and 
integrate a module in a system for the first time and the subsequent times. This effect is 
particularly noticeable for the design and qualification phases. For example, once a module has 
been tested and (space-)qualified, its subsequent versions will require limited amount of 
additional testing before it can be integrate into a new system. In short, the first advantage of 
modularity (at the module level) consists of eliminating certain tasks during the design and 
development of modules for subsequent systems, and it so doing, the system’s development 
schedule is shortened and responsiveness is improved. 
 The second advantage of modularity extends more continuously over time, as more systems 
using the same module are designed. This second argument takes us back to the discussion of 
heritage and learning curves. As mentioned previously, tasks that are performed repetitively are 
subject to important learning effects, during the manufacturing phase for example. The use of a 
given module (or module design) allows taking full advantage of the learning effects associated 
with the repetitive use of a module (or module design). 
 Finally, both effects demonstrate that the benefits of modularity in terms of responsiveness lie 
in the re-use of the same module (or module design) across multiple systems.  
 
Limited research has been conducted to date to quantify the impact of modularity on space 
responsiveness. We believe this is an important area of investigation for the space community in a 
period of heightened emphasis on responsiveness. 
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Schedule constraints, time compressibility, and mission success: Why mission reliability is 
NOT a lever of responsiveness 
 In a recent study, Bitten et al.14 indicated that “during the last decade, NASA’s missions were 
developed in roughly half the time of their traditional predecessors: 3.6 years versus 7.1 years on 
average.” This reduction in development time, or schedule compression, can be construed as a 
significant improvement in responsiveness of the space industry; in some cases it is, but the 
argument and analyses put forth by the authors tell a different, more subtle story that require 
careful attention.  
 First, the authors demonstrate a strong correlation between “mission success and the time 
allocated to mission development.” Missions developed under strict schedule constraints and 
inadequate (schedule) growth possibility fail at a markedly higher rate than missions developed 
under looser schedule constraints. The authors show for example that, for their sample of 66 
spacecraft, successful missions took on average 11 months longer to develop than missions that 
failed.§§§§ While statistically meaningful, this result should not suggest that schedule compression 
always compromise mission reliability and success. Instead, this result can be cautiously 
interpreted as follows: given a mission complexity, schedule compression beyond a certain 
threshold can compromise mission success.  
 Second, the authors show that in their sample, planetary missions failed at a significantly 
higher rate that Earth-orbiting missions. While this observation may be due to the higher 
complexity of planetary missions, the authors propose a different interpretation. First, they argue 
that planetary missions, unlike Earth-orbiting missions, cannot afford schedule slip because of 
planetary alignments and stringent launch window constraints. Second, they provide data that 
indicate planetary missions, in their sample, incurred a 3.9% schedule growth from the initial 
planned schedule, whereas Earth-orbiting missions had a 38.3% schedule growth. The authors 
argue that this schedule growth, which allows for more thorough testing of the spacecraft, 
explains to a large extent the difference in failure rate between Earth-orbiting and planetary 
missions (see Figure 11). 
 
 
                                                
§§§§ The mean development time of successful missions in the authors’ sample was 46.5 months, with a 
standard deviation of 19 months (50 spacecraft). Failed missions had a mean development time of 35.1 
months, with a standard deviation of 14.2 months (16 spacecraft). 
AIAA Space 2007  AIAA-2007-6015 
18-20 September 2007, Long Beach, CA 
 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Risk implications of schedule compression and constraints. 
 
 
 In short, the research conducted by the authors, Bitten et al.14 investigated the implications of 
schedule constraints on spacecraft reliability. Their analyses and interpretation offer a cautionary 
note against aggressive schedule compression as it might compromise mission success—a result 
reminiscent of the adage: Faster, Better, Cheaper, choose two! 
 
 But the relationship between mission reliability and spacecraft development schedule can be 
investigated from another perspective than that of Bitten et al.14 In particular, one can ask: can 
space responsiveness be improved by trading mission reliability? In other words, is mission 
reliability a lever of space responsiveness? 
 
If the space industry chooses (or can afford) lower mission reliability (MR), then a number of 
activities during the development of a spacecraft can be scrapped or allotted a shorter amount 
time (e.g., testing). The result is a lower τ0 than for a more reliable spacecraft. This can be written 
as follows: 
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However, in our definition of τ0, we have included a condition that the spacecraft is operational 
and ready to fulfill the function it was designed and launched for. Compromising mission 
reliability can be interpreted as violating this condition, and should therefore not be considered a 
lever of responsiveness in the context of the present work. It should be noted that our argument is 
confined to mission reliability and does not address subsystem or module reliability.***** 
 
B. The launch levers of responsiveness: launch vehicles and launch ranges 
 
 The literature on responsive space has early identified launch vehicles as key enablers of the 
global space industry’s responsiveness. This argument falls under what we termed in Section 4 
the local stakeholder responsiveness, in which the stakeholder is the launch provider. However, 
while many papers focused on new launch vehicle concepts and their potential benefits in terms 
of responsiveness, fewer discussed the required improvements at the launch range level to enable 
said responsiveness. It is nevertheless essential to acknowledge the respective importance of both 
launch vehicles and launch ranges—a particular kind of a system-of-systems—as they jointly 
determine the availability and pace of the overall launch process. 
 
 At present, it typically takes several months from the time a spacecraft is shipped from the 
manufacturer’s premise to the launch facility, to the time when it is placed on orbit. This duration 
is increasingly viewed as an objectionable lack of responsiveness, both for commercial and 
(especially) military customers. Tackling this problem, the Operationally Responsive Space 
(ORS) initiative within the Department of Defense aims at launching within 48 hours of call-up. 
To reach such short turnaround times, one proposed solution requires having launch vehicle parts 
available “off-the-shelf,” so that launchers are built-to-inventory. Such a new approach implies 
new constraints, among which is the use of propellants capable of being stored at ambient 
temperatures. Storability of vehicle “parts” is therefore a necessary condition for this solution to 
ensure responsive launch, and vehicle prototypes such as the SpaceDev’s Streaker are currently 
under development to satisfy this condition.25 
 
 Procedures governing the assembly of vehicle parts and the transport to the launch pad also 
determine the rapidity of a launch. Implications of the propellant choice extend to these phases, as 
toxic and hazardous fluids require special, and therefore time-consuming handling. Also, ease of 
transport and accessibility of the vehicle can significantly reduce time lags preceding launch. For 
example, vehicles from the Scorpius family are assembled at or near the primary launch site, 
transported vertically on cradles or flatbed trailers, and their short size allows them to be serviced 
directly from the ground, without the need for large service towers.26 Other design choices 
translate into quicker pre-launch operations and checkout. The Falcon I by SpaceX is equipped 
with a fairly unique thrust termination system replacing the more common explosive destruct 
device installed on most of the launchers. As a result, “Space X estimates at least one day of 
operations were saved by removing the explosive ordnance from the system. ”5  If new 
technologies and handling methods need to be studied to meet Responsive Space objectives in 
the long-term, their development also requires an additional time investment. Heritage as a 
lever of responsiveness discussed previously is therefore as relevant for launch systems as for 
the payload itself. Thus, vehicles from the Minotaur family created by Orbital Sciences 
Corporation have been designed to take advantage of previous developments by the 
company: “heritage, and sibling relationships, […] make them imminently adaptable to 
responsive launch requirements.”27  
                                                
***** Module reliability contributes to, but does not fully determine, mission reliability. System architecture 
(or structure) is an equally important contributor to the overall mission reliability.  
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 In a larger sense, the major problem underlying launch responsiveness, or lack of it, resides in 
what is referred to in the Operations Research literature as the build-to-order versus the build-
to-inventory production approaches (see for example Holweg and Pil28), and the associated 
financial risks and cost implications, borne dissymmetrically by the various stakeholders in the 
space industry. In the following, we expand on this observation, which we believe is one of the 
root causes of lack of launch responsiveness. 
 
 What are the build-to-order (BTO) and build-to-inventory (BTI) production 
approaches? Launch vehicles today are effectively built-to-order, that is, they are built for a 
specific mission/spacecraft and after a confirmed order–with all the financial guarantees–for the 
vehicle has been placed29; the build-to-order approach is sometimes referred to as “pull” 
production system in which the market effectively “pulls” the products from the manufacturer. By 
contrast, the build-to-inventory is a “push” production approach in which products are 
manufactured (and sent to the “inventory”) not in response to confirmed orders, but in the hope 
that “pushing” said products onto the marketplace will result in them being purchased. It is easy 
to conceive of hybrid production approaches that lie between these two ends of the spectrum 
(BTO and BTI) and for which 1) products are built in part to order, and in part to inventory, 2) 
products are built to (credible) sales forecast, 3) products are built with varying degrees of 
commitments from the customers (shy of firm orders). 
 
 What are the economic implications of the BTO and BTI approaches? The literature on 
responsive launch advocates a shift from build-to-order to build-to-inventory approach to launch 
vehicles in order to ensure responsiveness. We do not disagree with this recommendation. 
However, the absence of discussions in the literature of incentives, risk exposure, and economic 
implications for the launch providers to shift from BTO to BTI suggests either a lack of 
understanding of corporate decision-making or an economic immaturity of this literature that gets 
it ignored or leave limited impact on the industry. The analysis of the risk and economic 
implications of a shift from BTO to BTI to the launch providers requires particular attention and 
deserves a treatment of its own; while such an analysis falls outside the scope of this work, its 
general outline is highlighted herein (and summarized in Figure 12): 
 
1. Launch vehicles are highly complex and costly artifacts—with a price tag roughly around 
$100 million for many of them. The design of launch vehicles is driven by and matches 
the present day dominant design of spacecraft as large monoliths (see Anderson and 
Tushman30, and Henderson and Clark31 for the seminal work on dominant designs and 
disruptive technologies and architectures). 
2. Given the high cost of a launch vehicle and the low volume nature of the launch business, 
launch providers cannot afford the financial risks that come with the build-to-inventory 
production approach, or the significant inventory holding costs associated with this 
production approach. The build-to-order approach therefore is both a lower risk and cost 
approach to the launch providers than the build-to-inventory. 
3. From a customer’s perspective however, the build-to-order of launch vehicles, unlike the 
build-to-inventory, is a non-responsive approach and results in significant delays before a 
needed capability is placed on-orbit. Launch responsiveness, as seen from the end-
customer’s perspective (e.g., the Air Force), is therefore traded against lower financial 
risks and inventory costs by the launch providers.  
 
 Enticing the launch providers to switch from a BTO to BTI, and hence towards a more 
responsive production approach, will succeed only when credible (and creative) economic 
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solutions are found to 1) distribute the financial risks between the launch providers and the end-
customers, and 2) have the latter share in the inventory holding costs associated with the build-to-
inventory approach. This we believe is an important topic for further research and in-depth 
analysis. 
 
 Another hypothetical solution for the switch from BTO to BTI is to dramatically lower the 
cost of launch vehicles. This can only happen if the current dominant architecture of spacecraft 
(large monolith) is significantly challenged (or disrupted) and a new spacecraft design paradigm 
emerges and proves competitive, such as powerful micro-satellites or fractionated spacecraft.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Responsiveness and implications of BTO and BTI to launch providers and end-customers. 
 
 
 We now turn to a brief discussion of launch ranges as they pertain to space responsiveness. 
Just like airports have a limited capacity to handle air traffic, so do launch ranges have a limited 
launch turnover rate. Saturation of the launch range capacity can generate an important 
“bottleneck” representing a challenge for the responsiveness of the space industry. It is often 
argued that the current number of launch ranges around the world is not sufficient to satisfy the 
demand without generating waiting periods. In addition, most ranges are government-owned, and 
function under significant restrictions that often result in delays of the order of months in their 
operations (i.e., lack of range responsiveness). To tackle this problem, several initiatives have 
recently emerged to build private launch ranges that would allow more lean operations and would 
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“un-choke” the current flow of demand in launches. For example, the Mojave Spaceport became 
the first facility to be certified as a spaceport by the FAA in 2004, and allowed the flight of 
X-Prize’s winner SpaceShipOne. Similarly, Spaceport America, built in New Mexico in 2006, 
experienced its first successful launch of a SpaceLoft XL rocket in April 2007. 
  
C. Selection, acquisition, and reviews: the “soft” levers of space responsiveness 
 
 In discussing the levers of responsiveness, we first focused in Section 6 on the system-level 
attributes—such as complexity and modularity—of the spacecraft under development, and 
explored how changes in these attributes impacted the development and manufacturing schedule 
of the spacecraft. Their impact on the development and manufacturing schedule in turn translates 
into changes in responsiveness of the space industry, hence our classification of these attributes as 
“levers of responsiveness,” or more specifically as spacecraft-centric levers of responsiveness. 
 
 Following our discussion of spacecraft attributes as levers of responsiveness, we addressed 
the launch levers of responsiveness as they pertain to changes in launch vehicles (design, 
operation, and shift from BTO to BTI approaches) and launch ranges. 
 
 But as mentioned previously, efforts to improve space responsiveness ought not focus solely 
on the technical and operational characteristics of the artifacts created by the space industry (e.g., 
spacecraft and launchers), but should also address the legal, organizational, and managerial 
aspects of “doing business” in this industry. These aspects pertain to both the interactive 
responsiveness, as we defined it in Section 4, and the “self-responsiveness” or the τintrinsic(LS) term 
introduced in Eq. 3. In this section, we focus on these “soft” levers of responsiveness (as 
opposed to the technical or engineering levers discussed previously) and briefly discuss how 
improvements to the following can impact space responsiveness: 1) the selection process of 
competing proposals, in response to an RFP, for a particular on-orbit capability, 2) the design 
reviews during the development process of a space system, and 3) the acquisition policies of 
space assets, in the particular case of military acquisition. Our coverage is not meant to be 
exhaustive of all soft levers of responsiveness; for example issues pertaining to supplier 
management are not addressed here, but we believe they are important and deserve their own 
careful treatment from a management science and operations research perspective. 
 
Selection process 
 Selection of competing proposals for a space asset is included in our work as a lever of 
responsiveness because of the way we defined the time constant associated with the global 
responsiveness of the space industry τ0—starting from the time when the need is identified and 
formalized, and not from the time when the program is initiated. We recognize that different 
definitions of responsiveness can exclude the selection process for the levers of responsiveness; 
in the following, we argue why we believe its inclusion is relevant. 
 
 No research that we are aware of has been conducted to date to benchmark the selection 
process of competing proposals for on-orbit capabilities in a military acquisition context (e.g., Air 
Force, NRO), in a government civilian context (e.g., NASA, NOAA), and in a commercial 
context (satellite operators). Such empirical research would be of significant value to multiple 
stakeholders in the space industry, especially in a period of heightened emphasis on 
responsiveness. Academia, with the support of various government agencies for example, can 
take the lead on such research and provide a thorough and unbiased analysis of selection 
processes for different programs and within several agencies; the end-objective of such research 
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would be to identify and share best practices that supports responsiveness across the space 
industry. 
 
 Recently, Bitten et al.14, in discussing the effects of schedule constraints on planetary 
missions, touched upon the issues mentioned in the previous paragraph but only in the context of 
NASA’s Discovery missions. They noted for example that  
 
 “the Discovery selection process is a lengthy undertaking, [and it takes] over 2 years 
from the development of a draft AO until the start of missions formulation.”  
 
If other NASA or DOD space programs are Discovery-like in their selection process, the 
corresponding two years that follow the issuance of an RFP for an on-orbit capability and the 
time when a contractor is actually selected to start the work on said capability are clearly not 
responsive and unacceptable in an environment where responsiveness is a strategic imperative. It 
is therefore of primary importance that the structure and various steps within the selection process 
be thoroughly analyzed and its bottlenecks identified and streamlined in order to improve space 
responsiveness. We propose that, in a Federal acquisition context for example, the selection 
process of space assets should not only emphasize fairness and accountability, but also and 
explicitly, timeliness (not just efficiency). A reduction in time of the selection process from two 
years to say a few months would constitute a major improvement in space responsiveness, which 
can be obtained without having to pull on the other (probably more expensive) technical levers of 
responsiveness (hence the importance of the study we proposed in the previous paragraph). The 
selection process therefore falls in the upper right corner (high priority) of the responsiveness 
map introduced in Section 5, and illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. 
 
Design reviews 
Spacecraft are developed according to the traditional stage-gate development model. Multiple 
design reviews punctuate the development process and offer several advantages that justify their 
existence. For example: 
 
i. They provide visibility into the project’s progress (compared to initial plans and 
customer’s needs and expectations) for multiple stakeholders, including the customer and 
senior management. 
ii. They allow the (early) identification of design errors and other problems with the 
project; in so doing, design reviews allow the mitigation of development risk—the earlier 
problems are identified during the development process, the easier and cheaper they are 
to address. 
iii. They allow for a multi-disciplinary assessment of the level of quality and maturity of 
the project before the project is allowed to proceed to the next phase and additional 
resources are committed to the project. 
 
These reviews however take time, and in an environment where responsiveness is a necessity and 
a strategic imperative, it is worth carefully exploring other more expeditious and/or less frequent 
program management assessments and controls approaches. Consider the following: Zirger and 
Hartley32 noted that 
 
“in the traditional stage-gate model, valuable time can be lost scheduling and preparing 
for senior management updates. Moreover, during these updates, senior management 
may also assign additional and non-essential tasks to the project team.”  
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We heard anecdotal evidence from major satellite manufacturers about the impact of frequent 
design reviews and intense customer involvement in the development process of a spacecraft that 
stretches the development schedule by over 50%. On the other hand, a small highly responsive 
company that builds micro-satellites told us they engage their suppliers with a “handshake and 
trust,” no progress reviews are conducted until the items are delivered. While this approach 
involves a significant degree of risk and may not scale well for larger companies and major 
satellite manufacturers, it does indicate nevertheless the possibility of responsiveness 
improvement through a careful balance and trade-off between risk and the frequency of design 
reviews on the one hand, and the development schedule on the other hand. The prerequisite to 
such a delicate balance is trust between customers and suppliers in the space industry, as well as 
trust between senior management and technical leads (or project team) within a company. As 
engineers, we would have never expected to come to the conclusion that “trust” is a lever of 
responsiveness! More research is necessary to carefully explore this delicate and important 
subject (of carefully balancing senior management and customer trust, support, and input into the 
project development while minimizing their intrusion on and disruption of the project’s schedule). 
 
Acquisition policies 
In the following, we focus on acquisitions policies of space systems within the DOD. We first 
highlight the nature and magnitude of the problem (i.e., how/where space acquisition programs 
are failing); second, we discuss the relevance of acquisitions policies to space responsiveness; 
third, we point out what are the likely root causes of these problems and suggest a few possible 
solutions. As with the previous topics in Section 6, acquisition policies are here discussed 
inasmuch as they constitute a lever of space responsiveness. 
 
All the government studies by the General Accountability Office (GAO) as well as the report of 
the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition 
of National Security Space Programs (also known as the “Young Panel report”33) are consistent in 
their message that the DOD acquisition policies, despite recent reforms, are dramatically failing. 
Consider the following: 
 
“In FY2008 alone, DOD expects to spend over $22 billion dollars to develop and 
procure satellites and other space systems. […]. The majority of major acquisition 
programs in DOD’s space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two 
decades that have driven up costs and schedules and increased technical risks. At times, 
cost growth has come close to or exceeded 100-percent (hundreds of millions to billion of 
dollars), causing the DOD to nearly double its investment without realizing a better 
return on investment. Along with the cost increases, many [space] programs are 
experiencing significant schedule delays, as much as 6 years, postponing delivery of 
promised capabilities to the warfighter […]. In some cases, capabilities have not been 
delivered to the warfighter after decades of development. […]. Outcomes have been so 
disappointing in some cases that DOD has had to go back to the drawing board to 
consider new ways to achieve the same or less capability.”34 
 
In short, the DOD, the world’s largest single customer of space systems, has a “poor record of 
developing satellites within cost and schedule targets and with promised performance.”35 How is 
this observation, and DOD’s acquisition policies, relevant to space responsiveness? 
 
 Figure 13 shows the current delays or schedule slippage for a six DOD programs: the 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite secure communications system, the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) BLOCK IIF upgrade satellites, The National Polar-orbiting 
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Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), The high-capacity Wideband Global 
SATCOM (WGS) satellites, and the Space Based Infrared System–High for military infrared 
surveillance. The reader is referred to the GAO-07-406SP36 for details about these programs. 
 
 It is not surprising, given Figure 13 and the assessments by GAO and the “Young report” of 
DOD’s poor track record of developing satellites within schedule that the emphasis on space 
responsiveness first emerged within the DOD as an effort to first contain or stop the systemic 
schedule slippage of space programs, and second to compress their development schedule—the 
former being probably more important to DOD in the near future. While we have focused so far 
in this paper on responsiveness improvement as schedule compression, it is important to 
recognize the dual nature of this problem, with the prevention of responsiveness deterioration or 
averting schedule slippage as the other side of the coin (i.e., one side, schedule compression; the 
other side, avoiding schedule slippage). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Delays and schedule slippage since program start (adapted from GAO-07-730T34) 
 
 
What are the roots causes of these problems highlighted by GAO and the Young report, and how 
can schedule slippage, or the worsening of responsiveness be averted? In the following, we focus 
on three particular causes underlying these problems, and recognize that solutions to this schedule 
slippage problem constitute a special kind of responsiveness levers:  
 
i. The DOD acquisition policies of space systems, unlike most other weapon systems, 
allows for and supports the development of low TRL technologies within an acquisition 
program, instead of confining technology development to the “S&T [Science and 
Technology] environment, which is more forgiving and less costly than a delivery-
oriented acquisition program environment.”37 When technologies not mature enough are 
included in spacecraft acquisition, “programs invariably run into problems that require 
more time and money to fix.”38 This is one of the major problems underlying the 
schedule slippage of the programs shown on Figure 13. All the studies by GAO of major 
weapon systems acquired by the DOD have identified the separation of technology 
development from system acquisition as a best practice. This has prompted GAO to 
recommend that the DOD not “allow technologies to enter into a weapon system’s 
SBIR High 
AIAA Space 2007  AIAA-2007-6015 
18-20 September 2007, Long Beach, CA 
 
 
 34 
development [and acquisition] until they are assessed [at least at] TRL 7, meaning that a 
prototype has been demonstrated in an operational environment.”35, 39 This 
recommendation supports our previous discussion of “Heritage, Learning Curve, and 
TRL” as levers of responsiveness.  
 
ii. The second major cause underlying the problems illustrated in Figure 13 is the 
“undisciplined definition and uncontrollable growth in system requirements” occurring 
after the program has started (“Young report”, 2003). In other words, requirements for 
space systems are not adequately defined at the start of the program, or they are changed 
significantly after the program started, thus resulting in the significant schedule delays 
that we observe in DOD’s acquisition of space systems.38 Decision-makers should 
therefore carefully consider balancing the conflicting urges of changing system 
requirements after a program has been started with the need for responsiveness. 
 
iii. The third major cause underlying the problems illustrated in Figure 13 is a hybrid of an 
organizational design and a program management problem. Consider the following: the 
Young report noted, “as space-based support has become more critical to National 
Security, the number of users [of space assets] has grown significantly. As a result, 
requirements proliferate.” This is echoed by a GAO finding that in some cases, “more 
than 30 organizations may have a hand in determining [and changing the] system’s 
performance requirement before a contractor with systems engineering expertise can 
identify [potential] gaps between the requirements and available resources.”38 Having an 
array of officials and organizations involved in requirement definitions and system 
acquisitions may not in and of itself be problem for responsiveness if the program 
managers are sufficiently empowered and have the authority (and accountability) to make 
the necessary trade-offs between requirements, requirements growth, and maintaining the 
program on schedule (and within budget). This unfortunately is not the case, and the 
present situation is the result of two policies.  
a. First, the “adoption of the Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) 
policy in the 1990s […] lessened the government’s program management role in 
favor of a stronger industry role, [and] essentially eroded the government’s 
ability to effectively manage and oversee space programs […]. Over time, this 
shift […] resulted in decline in critical capabilities within the government 
workforce, particularly for systems engineering.”38 This observation is supported 
by the Young report, which noted that “policies and strategies inherent in 
acquisition reforms inordinately devalued the systems engineering and 
acquisition workforce […] and [TSPR] marginalized the government program 
management role.” In short, the unfortunate combination of a growing number of 
officials and organizations involved in defining the requirements for space 
systems coupled with a lack of support and empowerment of DOD’s program 
management to make the necessary choices and trade-offs between competing 
demands result in the problems observed in Figure 13 and the DOD’s systemic 
inability to be responsive. 
b. Second, in addition to (and probably as a result of) the previously mentioned 
organizational and policy problems underlying DOD’s lack of responsiveness, 
GAO and the “Young report” highlighted both the problems resulting from short 
tenures among staff critical to achieving acquisition success and responsiveness, 
and the lack of experienced program managers within the DOD to effectively 
execute space acquisition programs: “there are not enough experienced program 
managers to run space programs […] and program managers are not always 
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experienced enough to stand up to contractors when development is being 
mismanaged.”38 
 
 In short, effective program management skills, and team empowerment—to make the 
necessary trade-offs during the requirement definition and system development phases in a timely 
and judicious manner—constitute as effective levers of responsiveness as the other (technical) 
levers discussed previously.  
 
 We are presently researching the possibility of developing a computational or Modeling and 
Simulation (M&S) approach to assessing the impact of acquisition reforms, in particular on space 
responsiveness. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
 The first objective of this paper was to clarify the definition of responsiveness in the context 
of the space industry. For that purpose, we started by drawing an analogy from controls theory, 
and emphasized the temporal dimension of responsiveness as indicated by the total time τ0 
elapsed from the instance when the need for a given on-orbit capability is identified and 
formalized to the time when the asset is operational on-orbit and ready to fulfill the function it 
was intended for. 
 
 Next, drawing on the concepts of cost structure and Total cost of Ownership, we proposed 
that an analog breakdown be undertaken, not of cost but of the total time τ0 to develop and launch 
a space system. The idea is to understand the various activities in the space industry (e.g., design, 
production, reviews, integration, testing, various bottlenecks and waiting times) following the 
issuance of an RFP for a new or modified on-orbit capability and how much time each activity 
contributes to the total time τ0. This is akin to creating a new accounting system with the various 
activities as line items, except that instead of “cost accounting” we have a “time accounting” of 
each activity. In order to improve space responsiveness, we argued that it is critical to thoroughly 
understand, 1) what are all these activities ai and how do they contribute, or not, to the overall 
development and readiness of the system, 2) what determines the duration of each activity τai and 
the degree of overlap between these activities—the first and second point bring about the idea of 
streamlining the workflow and of “time compressibility” as will be discussed later—and 3) where 
are the bottlenecks, why do they exist and how can they be eliminated. These issues were 
discussed in sections 5 and 6. 
 
We argued that conceptually, responsiveness is an attribute that is relevant for “customers” (or 
stakeholders with needs), and characterizes the reaction time of “suppliers” (or stakeholders 
addressing those needs, in whole or in part). Given this observation, the idea of multiple levels 
and different types of responsiveness becomes evident. To this effect, our review of the space 
industry value-chain lead us to define three levels of responsiveness: 
1) a global industry-wide responsiveness, which is seen from the perspective of the end-
customer. This is a “macro-level” attribute of the whole space industry. We referred to 
the end-customer in the space industry as the one who issues the RFP for a given space 
capability and “pays the bill” for the whole space asset 
2) a local stakeholder responsiveness within the industry value-chain, as seen from the 
perspective of its local customer (as opposed to the “end-customer”) 
3) an interactive or inter-stakeholder responsiveness, which is dependent upon and 
determined by how well (or efficiently) the customer interacts and works with its 
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suppliers. We emphasize again that this interactive responsiveness is jointly controlled 
and determined by both the customer and the supplier. 
 
 Following our discussion of the three levels of responsiveness, we introduced and motivated 
the use of a new tool we termed “responsiveness maps” for multiple stakeholders in the space 
industry as a means for identifying focus areas and prioritizing efforts to credibly improve 
responsiveness. We argued that efforts to improve space responsiveness should not only focus on 
the architecture and technical characteristics of the artifacts created by said industry, but also 
include the legal, organizational, and managerial aspects of “doing business” in this industry; our 
last section in this paper identified multiple “levers of responsiveness,” including technical 
spacecraft- and launch-centric, as well as “soft” levers (e.g., acquisition policies) for effectively 
improving the responsiveness of the space industry. Finally, we proposed a series of research 
questions to aggressively tackle problems associated with space responsiveness. 
 We believe the framework here developed will prove useful to engineers and decision-makers 
in thinking about credibly addressing issues of space responsiveness. These issues, as we showed 
in this paper, offer many exciting opportunities for theoretical and empirical research and 
contributions. In addition, we believe that academia can provide the necessary 
thought-partnership that can help the industry and government agencies tackle the problems of 
responsiveness (or lack of). 
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